Statements released by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and congressional testimony by Chairman Greenspan are found to significantly affect market interest rates, indicating that central bank "talk" conveys important information to market participants. These effects arise not only because the statements provide information about the near-term policy inclinations of the FOMC but also because the statements convey information about the outlook for the economy. By contrast, statements raising questions about asset valuations typically have not generated a significant response of those asset prices.
Introduction
Central banks around the world have become considerably more transparent over the past decade. A key element of this increased transparency has been more extensive efforts by central banks to communicate their views about the economic outlook, the important elements shaping that outlook, and the possible consequences for monetary policy.
This paper investigates the effects of central bank statements and draws some inferences about their use by central banks. The paper was prepared for a Festschrift hosted by the Bank of Canada in honor of Chuck Freeman, who has played a leading role in highlighting the potential benefits of central bank communication and realizing them in practice (see, for example, Freedman (1996 Freedman ( , 2002 ). He has stressed the value of transparency for improving the public's understanding and support of monetary policy and the democratic accountability of the central bank. In addition, he has emphasized that transparency can enhance the effectiveness of policy by fostering behavior in wages and prices and in financial markets that should help the central bank achieve its objectives of stabilizing prices and damping fluctuations in economic activity. Chuck has not just theorized about transparency-he has actively promoted it in his work at the Statements might also convey shifts in the central bank's views of the economic outlook and the associated risks, which in turn might influence investors' own expectations for the economy. But it is not entirely clear how large this effect may be, considering that the economic information available to the central bank is typically available to the public as well. Overall, the extent to which central bank statements provide information to private agents is a question that must be answered empirically. We then turn to determining the underlying reasons for these effects. The most obvious explanation is that the statements may be seen as partly revealing the near-term policy inclinations of the FOMC. We attempt to determine whether, in addition, some of the effects arise because the statements convey information about the economic outlook.
Lastly, we consider whether a smaller set of statements in which Chairman Greenspan raised questions about the valuations of particular assets caused those asset prices to adjust.
This work is a first step in a research program to provide central banks with useful evidence on what kinds of communication are most successful for realizing the potential benefits of transparency. Our findings raise a number of issues regarding the use of statements by central banks. Among those, we consider whether statements provide the central bank with an additional policy instrument that has a degree of independence from its actions. In addition, we discuss whether the effects of statements depend on the type of statement, including whether investors focus on simple balance-of-risk assessments to a greater extent than the more detailed language of other statements. Lastly, our results address the issue of whether central banks can "talk down" (or "talk up") particular asset prices that they feel may be incorrectly valued.
Three Types of Communication by the FOMC
The Federal Reserve, like other central banks around the world, communicates with the public through a variety of channels. In this paper, we focus on three types of central bank talk that we believe to be influential: FOMC statements released immediately following policy meetings or intermeeting policy actions, congressional testimony by Chairman Greenspan, and major speeches by Chairman Greenspan. In this section, we describe each of these in more detail. For most of the analysis that follows, we consider Federal Reserve communication that took place between January 3, 1989, and April 7, 2003 .
FOMC Statements
Policy statements that accompany FOMC actions or meetings are an important form of communication by the FOMC, given that they are released frequently and that they receive intense scrutiny by market participants. Of course, the timing and content of these statements have changed over time, as described in Table 1 . From January 1989 to December 1993, the FOMC typically relied on open market operations, rather than statements, to signal shifts in the stance of monetary policy. On most occasions over this period, market participants were able to identify policy changes in a timely manner, but they were not provided with any rationale for those changes. The exceptions were changes in the federal funds rate that accompanied changes in the discount rate. In those instances, the Federal Reserve Board would produce a press release with a brief rationale for the discount rate change, which presumably also explained the change in the federal funds rate.
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From February 1994 to November 1998, the FOMC began releasing statements that accompanied changes in the federal funds rate.
2 Those statements offered a brief description of the rationale for the policy action. The statements did not, however, include an explicit assessment of the risks going forward. Market participants could learn about the near-term policy inclination of the FOMC, or the so-called "policy tilt," by reading the minutes that were released after the subsequent FOMC meeting, but those minutes were typically viewed as being too stale to provide much significant information.
At its December 1998 meeting, the FOMC implemented an important change in its disclosure practices. In addition to releasing statements accompanying policy actions, the FOMC decided to release statements when "it wanted to communicate to the public a major shift in its views about the balance of risks or the likely direction of future policy."
It first did so at the May 1999 FOMC meeting, when it announced a policy tilt toward tightening, and it subsequently released a statement indicating its policy tilt at every meeting over the remainder of the year.
FOMC disclosure policy changed again in January 2000, when the Committee announced that a statement would be released after every FOMC meeting and would always include an assessment of the "balance of risks." This balance-of-risks assessment involved new language that was linked more closely to the Committee's macroeconomic objectives than to the near-term direction of policy. More specifically, the statement would indicate whether the risks to the outlook for the economy over the "foreseeable future" were weighted toward "heightened inflation pressures" or "economic weakness"
or whether those risks were balanced. This policy remained in effect until March 2003, when the Committee released a statement that refrained from assessing the balance of risks. At the subsequent meeting, in May 2003 (which falls after the end of our sample), the Committee again altered its risk assessment to allow the specification of two-sided risks to both inflation and economic growth.
Our sample includes 114 FOMC meetings and sixty-two changes in the federal funds rate-twenty-eight of which were intermeeting moves. Grouping FOMC meetings with intermeeting actions gives us 142 "FOMC decision" days. In total, statements were released on fifty-six of those FOMC decision days. The amount of information provided in these statements surely varied over the sample, but no trend was significant enough to take into consideration, and so we do not make distinctions across these days in the analysis below.
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Testimony by Chairman Greenspan
The second form of communication that we consider is congressional testimony by Chairman Greenspan. The Chairman has testified on a variety of topics in front of many congressional committees. We will focus on a subset of his testimonies in which he focused on current economic conditions, the economic outlook, and monetary policy.
The testimonies that seem to receive the most attention are those that accompany each semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. Those testimonies focus explicitly on the state of the economy and, along with the Chairman's answers to questions posed by the members of the committee before which he appears, receive considerable scrutiny by market participants. 4 We also consider testimony by Chairman Greenspan before the Joint Economic Committee and the Senate or House budget committees. Those testimonies typically take place several times a year and receive considerable attention in the financial press, in part because they, too, often discuss current economic issues. Our sample includes sixty-six testimonies by Chairman Greenspan, of which twenty-nine accompanied the Monetary Policy Report.
Speeches by Chairman Greenspan
The third type of communication we consider is speeches by Chairman
Greenspan. The Chairman speaks to a variety of audiences on a large number of topics.
We consider all of his speeches from June 1996 to the end of our sample. 5 Over that period, Chairman Greenspan gave 123 speeches, or an average of about eighteen per year. We found no apparent trend in the annual number of speeches that he has given.
Of course, other members of the FOMC give speeches that also convey important information to market participants, but here we limit our focus to those by Chairman Greenspan.
Does Central Bank Talk Matter?
Our first objective is to determine whether the three types of central bank communication described in the previous section have conveyed relevant information about the economy and asset prices to investors and other private agents. To address this question, we investigate whether Federal Reserve communication (a term we will use to encompass all three types of talk) has had a significant effect on financial market variables from January 3, 1989 , to April 7, 2003 . The financial variables we consider are the federal funds futures rate expiring three months ahead, eurodollar futures rates expiring two and four quarters ahead, two-and ten-year Treasury yields, one-year Treasury forward rates ending one to four years ahead, the S&P 500 index, and the foreign exchange value of the dollar.
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The three types of communication considered provide us with a relatively large set of dates to investigate the effects of central bank talk. As described above, our sample includes fifty-six days on which the FOMC released a statement with its policy decision, sixty-six days of testimony by Chairman Greenspan, and 123 days (since 1996) on which the Chairman gave speeches. We begin by focusing on the effects of FOMC statements.
Effects of FOMC Policy Statements
The primary difficulty in assessing whether FOMC statements have an effect on financial variables is that no clear way exists to quantify those statements. Considering this difficulty, we focus on the volatility of the financial variables on days of FOMC 
where D is the total number of days in the month, d is the day of the month of the FOMC decision, and 1 ff D is the change in the futures rate on the day of the policy decision.
This measure is computed for all days with FOMC meetings and intermeeting actions over our sample, and it is set to zero for all other days.
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Of course, the financial variables considered may also be significantly affected by a number of other factors, including macroeconomic data releases. Some of those data releases took place on the days of monetary policy surprises, thus affecting the volatility of the financial variables on those days. This consideration may be particularly relevant for the period before 1994, when a number of FOMC actions took place between meetings and, often, directly in response to data releases. We address this issue by allowing the financial variables to also respond to the surprise component of a number of data releases, where the surprise is computed as the realized value (as it was published that day) less the expected value from a survey conducted by Money Market Services. 9 We denote the ith macroeconomic data surprise u i mac , which is set to zero for all days that did not involve that data release. 8 We exclude the policy easing on the morning of September 17, 2001, because of the disruption in financial markets around that period. 9 The expected values are the median responses from the most recent Money Market Services survey, which is typically conducted the Friday before each data release. Some of the macroeconomic surprise variables begin later in the sample because of availability of the survey data. We set all the surprises to Following the common event-study approach, we allow the daily change in each financial variable, y D , to respond linearly to the unexpected component of FOMC policy decisions and to the macroeconomic data surprises, as follows:
In determining the set of data releases, we include all of those that were found to have a significant effect on the three-month-ahead federal funds futures contract. This procedure yields a set of thirteen relevant macroeconomic surprises, which we maintain for all the financial variables. As an example of the results, zero for the three-month period beginning on September 11, 2001, when many of the data releases were distorted in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. 10 This observation applies to all existing event-study papers as well. However, Bomfim and Reinhart (2000) find that the response coefficient did not change under the FOMC's new disclosure policy that began in 1994, suggesting that the correlation is limited.
The results are reported in To gauge the importance of these effects, we compare the increase in the variance of a given instrument attributed to the statement to that induced directly by the realized monetary policy decision. As reported in the first column of Table 4 , unexpected policy actions have a significant effect on many of the financial variables considered. Federal funds and eurodollar futures rates move in the direction of the policy surprise, with the effect moderating as the contract horizon extends out to one year. Similarly, the two-year
Treasury yield and forward rates out to two years respond significantly in the direction of the policy surprise, while the ten-year Treasury yield and forward rates at longer horizons respond less strongly. Lastly, equity prices fall in response to a tightening surprise, and the dollar appreciates. Collectively, these results are qualitatively consistent with those found in the event-study literature.
14 These estimated responses, along with the variance of the policy surprises observed over our sample (164 basis points), are used to compute the variances of the financial variables attributed to their direct response to policy actions. For the threemonth-ahead federal funds futures rate, the direct response to the policy action accounts for most of the increase in the variance on FOMC days (see the last three columns of follow. This seemingly "neutral" risk assessment sparked a rally in equity markets and a decline in Treasury yields. But even statements without such an obvious tilt appear to have generated a considerable response in financial markets.
Effects of Testimonies and Speeches
To measure the effects of the other forms of central bank talk consideredtestimonies and speeches by Chairman Greenspan-we rely on the same methodology.
One difference from the above results is that these forms of communication are typically not accompanied by policy action, and so controlling for the unexpected component of current policy decisions becomes less important. Nevertheless, given that the model is estimated over all days in the sample, we continue to control for unexpected policy actions and economic data surprises. More specifically, we estimate equation (2) as above and investigate whether the variance of the error term increases on days of Chairman Greenspan's testimonies to Congress or on days of his speeches.
The results are presented in Table 5 . As a reference for comparison, the first column repeats the results using FOMC statements (from Table 3 ). As was the case for FOMC statements, Chairman Greenspan's testimonies to the Congress have had a significant effect on many of the variables considered, including federal funds and eurodollar futures rates, the two-year Treasury yield, and Treasury forward rates. In fact, the estimated increases in the variances of those variables are larger and more significant for the Chairman's testimonies than they are for FOMC statements. Moreover, the effects of the Chairman's testimonies extend much farther out the yield curve, with a significant response found even for the ten-year Treasury yield.
The finding that the Chairman's testimonies have a significant effect on near-term interest rates is perhaps not surprising, because market participants would presumably focus on his comments for the same information contained in FOMC policy statements.
However, the fact that significant effects are realized on much longer-term instruments provides a hint that the testimonies contain somewhat different information than that found in FOMC statements-a topic we consider in detail in the next section.
The results are much weaker for Chairman Greenspan's speeches. Indeed, we do not find significant effects on any of the financial variables in this case. The effects of some of his speeches, however, are likely diluted by the inclusion of other speeches that
were not viewed as containing relevant information. Indeed, the Chairman gives speeches on a wide range of topics, and the extent to which those speeches touch on the current economic environment varies considerably. Judging from the effects of his testimonies, we believe that speeches that address the current or prospective economic environment are likely to generate a significant market response. Our approach probably includes enough instances in which he did not address those topics to obscure the effects of speeches that did.
Why Does Talk Matter?
The previous section provided statistical evidence that statements by the FOMC and congressional testimony by Chairman Greenspan have had significant effects on a number of financial variables, particularly interest rates that span relatively short horizons. This section takes up the more difficult task of assessing why these forms of communication have elicited those responses. Most Federal Reserve communication probably contains some information about both the economic outlook and the expected near-term path of monetary policy. We attempt to distinguish the effects of these two components in the first subsection. A much smaller set of statements has addressed a different topic-the possibility that financial assets were improperly valued. We discuss those statements and their effects in the second subsection.
Statements about Monetary Policy and the Economy
The significant influence of FOMC statements and testimony by Chairman
Greenspan on short-term interest rates presumably reflects their effects on investors'
expectations for the near-term path of the federal funds rate. These revisions to expected policy could, to a large extent, be independent of any new information on the economy.
Indeed, FOMC decisions involve considerable judgment and flexibility on the part of the Committee, and thus policy actions at any given time may be difficult to predict, even when investors have access to the same data as the Committee. With that in mind, investors clearly read statements for information about the near-term policy inclinations of the FOMC, even for a given state of the economy.
However, a portion of the revision to the expected path of monetary policy also likely reflects the fact that statements convey information about the FOMC's views of economic conditions. This information takes many forms. Some may pertain to aspects of the long-run behavior of the economy, including both those that are out of the influence of the FOMC (such as structural productivity growth) and those that are under its complete control (such as the desired inflation rate in the long run). The press coverage, however, leads us to believe that the preponderance of the information obtained from statements relates to the strength of aggregate demand and inflationary pressures over the next year or two. To simplify our analysis, we limit our focus to this type of information about the economy.
In the following exercise, we attempt to parse movements in interest rates with relatively short horizons into the two components just described-one capturing perceived changes in the near-term policy inclinations of the FOMC (independent of the near-term economic outlook) and one capturing perceived changes in the FOMC's view of the economic outlook (and the associated policy response). 15 We will refer to these as the "policy-inclination" component and the "economic-outlook" component respectively.
To distinguish between these two components, we rely on the following observation: Even if the two components have the same effect on near-term policy expectations, they would presumably have very different effects on other asset prices.
Consider, for example, a statement indicating that a policy easing is likely, which generates a response of near-term policy expectations of a particular magnitude (reflected in the three-month-ahead federal funds futures rate). If the shift in policy expectations were viewed as a response to unexpected economic weakness, it might lead to a sizable decline in intermediate-horizon forward rates, as investors would anticipate a drawn-out policy response to the weaker economic conditions. By contrast, if the shift in policy expectations were seen as reflecting only the near-term predilection of the FOMC, it would presumably have a much smaller effect on forward rates, as the movement in the federal funds rate would be expected to be transitory.
As the example suggests, the effects of FOMC statements can be separated into these two unobserved components by looking beyond their effect on short-term interest rates and considering the responses of other financial variables-notably forward rates at longer horizons. More specifically, in addition to the response of the three-month-ahead federal funds futures rate, we will consider the response of the Treasury forward rate covering the period from one to two years ahead. Of course, we could have chosen a number of other financial variables to use in the decomposition. However, this forward rate has the advantage of having a significant overall response to policy statements (Table   3 ), while still having very different responses to the two components considered.
15 As discussed below, we focus on interest rates with relatively short horizons because the effects of FOMC statements seem to be limited to rates on instruments with maturities of two years or less (Table 3) . 
The first two factors, The interest rates are also affected by other news, which we capture with an "other"
factor, x h , which is present on all days over the sample. 16 The three shocks are assumed to be orthogonal to one another.
Our earlier results (Table 4) provide estimates of the increase in the variances of the two interest rates in response to FOMC actions and statements. We can also estimate the shift in the covariance between them using the same approach. Given the assumed structure in equation set (3), the shifts in the second moments of the two interest rates on FOMC days must be fully explained by the two policy-related factors, pol h and econ h .
The effects of these two factors on the near-term futures rate have been normalized to unity, and the effects on the Treasury forward rate are given by the parameters a and b.
Thus, we have four variables (the two impact parameters and the variances of the two factors) to be estimated from three pieces of information (the shifts in the variances of the two interest rates and in their covariance). Without any additional information, the problem is not identified.
We can achieve identification if we can determine the relative responses of the two interest rates to either the policy-inclination component or the economic-outlook component-that is, either the a or b parameter. Obtaining a measure of the former is difficult, as it would require finding unexpected policy actions that are clearly unrelated 16 Realistically, the factor x h is multidimensional. This modification would not affect our results.
to the state of the economy. However, an estimate of the latter can be derived on the basis of the response of asset prices to releases of macroeconomic data. These releases obviously do not contain any information about independent shifts in the FOMC's policy inclinations, but they clearly provide information about the economic outlookparticularly about the strength of aggregate demand or the extent of inflationary pressures that might be expected over the intermediate term.
Recall that in the results above, we estimated the response of the financial variables to a set of macroeconomic data releases. The results for the federal funds futures rate and the Treasury forward rate were shown in We use the relative response of the interest rates to macroeconomic news to pin down the parameter b, which is set to 1.70. By calibrating b this way, the factor econ h captures a component of policy-related effects that generates relative movements in the two interest rates identical to those found, on average, in response to macroeconomic data. We therefore interpret this factor as reflecting changes in investors' perceptions of the FOMC's outlook for the economy. That is, we assume that when investors revise their policy expectations in response to a perceived shift in the FOMC's economic outlook, they build in expectations of a gradual policy response identical to that observed when data releases cause a change in the economic outlook. 18 Investors might also 17 We find that the response of the forward rate relative to the near-term futures rate is 1.69 for a set of data releases containing only indicators of the near-term strength of aggregate demand, and 1.88 for a set of data releases containing only direct indicators of inflation. In fact, for every single data release considered, the response of the forward rate is larger in magnitude than that of the near-term futures rate. 18 The relative importance of changes in the outlook for the strength of aggregate demand and for inflationary pressures is determined by the typical magnitudes of the surprises in the macroeconomic data.
update their own perceptions about the economic outlook in response to the FOMC statement, a topic that we will discuss in greater detail in section 5.
The factor pol h then captures the other component of policy-related effects-the near-term policy inclination of the FOMC. The effect of the policy-inclination factor, a, will be estimated from the observed behavior of the two market interest rates on days of policy actions or statements. With b known, it can be shown that the parameter a equals
, where
In equation (4) We begin by applying this approach to the days of FOMC policy decisions. The increase in the variances of the interest rates on those days comes from two sources-the direct effect of policy actions and the effect of FOMC statements (Table 3) . We apply the decomposition to the total policy-related effects, or the sum of these components.
The estimate of parameter a is 0.34, a value indicating that revisions to policy expectations associated with the near-term policy inclinations of the FOMC generate a smaller response of the year-ahead forward rate. This pattern is consistent with a perception among investors that such shifts in policy are transitory in nature, which perhaps is not surprising given that those inclinations are independent of macroeconomic developments. Note also that the pattern differs considerably from that associated with shifts in the economic outlook, which have a larger effect at longer horizons.
19 19 The basic characteristic of the decomposition-that there is one transitory component and one persistent component-depends on our estimate of b. To assess the precision of this estimate, we use the estimated equations from Table 2 and the historical (joint) distribution of the shocks from those equations to generate 10,000 samples of the futures rate and the forward rate. We then compute the distribution of the parameter b by measuring the relative responses of the two rates to macroeconomic news under each of those iterations. The parameter estimate appears fairly precise-the 95-percent confidence interval for b ranges from 1.55 to 1.76. Under this range of values, the parameter a varies from 0.29 to 0.35.
In order to determine the relative importance of the two unobserved components, we first solve for their variances from the above decomposition. Recall that the relative effects of the economic-outlook factor have been imposed on the exercise, while those of the policy-inclination factor have been estimated. Thus, we are effectively asking whether any element of the effect of FOMC statements appears identical to the effect of macroeconomic data releases. If FOMC statements do not contain such an element, the exercise would simply set the variance of the economic-outlook factor to zero. Table 6 reports the variance decomposition of the two interest rates. 20 We first focus on the policy-related effects on days of FOMC decisions (the first three columns).
The table repeats the total effects of policy actions and statements on the variances of the two instruments (shown earlier in Table 4 ) and then breaks down those effects into the two components discussed above. The results indicate that policy actions are mostly associated with the near-term policy inclinations of the FOMC; those actions have most of their effects on near-term interest rates and smaller effects on longer-term rates-a pattern similar to that of the policy-inclination factor. By contrast, the effects of policy statements are importantly driven by the economic-outlook factor, which accounts for a sizable portion of the effect on the futures rate and nearly all of the effect on the forward rate. Looking at the effects of policy actions and statements together, we find that the effects on the near-term futures rate predominantly reflect the policy inclinations of the FOMC, which is not surprising. The total policy-related effects on the forward rate are instead primarily associated with the economic-outlook factor, reflecting the importance of policy statements in determining that rate.
Lastly, we apply the same decomposition to the effects of Chairman Greenspan's congressional testimony. In doing so, we maintain the value of the parameter a so that we can interpret the factors in the same manner. 21 (We do not consider the Chairman's speeches, since those were not found to generate a significant increase in the variances of the interest rates.) The results show that the factor associated with the economic outlook 20 For the near-term futures rate, the proportions are determined directly by the relative variances of the unobserved components, given that the loadings on each factor are normalized to 1. For the year-ahead forward rate, the variance induced by each factor is given by its squared loading multiplied by the variance of the factor. 21 If we re-estimate the parameter a, we get a value close to zero. But because the exercise assigns very little explanatory power to the policy-inclination factor, this parameter may not be estimated very precisely.
completely dominates-it accounts for more than the total increase in the variance of both the futures rate and the Treasury forward rate.
In our view, it is unlikely that these testimonies do not contain any perceived hints of the near-term policy inclinations of the FOMC. However, we do find it plausible that relative to FOMC statements, the Chairman's testimony tends to focus more extensively on the intermediate-term outlook for the economy than on the immediate policy inclination of the FOMC. After all, many of the testimonies, including the semiannual testimony that accompanies the Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, are explicitly intended to update the Congress on economic conditions.
The testimonies also touch more frequently on longer-term issues for the economy, such as structural changes to productivity growth and fiscal policy. 22 In that case, the market response might involve a factor associated with even more persistent interest rate responses, which the decomposition would likely group into the economicoutlook component. Given this consideration, the precise results from the decomposition should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, one conclusion clearly emerges from the analysis: The Chairman's testimonies strongly affect market interest rates in a manner that looks quite different from the effects associated only with perceived changes in near-term policy expectations.
Statements about Asset Valuations
Less frequently, Chairman Greenspan has made statements that fall into a distinct category-those that raise questions about the valuation of particular financial assets.
Reviewing speeches and testimonies of the Chairman since the mid-1990s, we found ten occasions when the Chairman either directly or indirectly warned that equity valuations were potentially too high, and six occasions when he warned that credit spreads were potentially too narrow or bank lending terms too generous. 23 Our list is not necessarily comprehensive, although we consulted a fairly large number of documents in our search.
22 Indeed, we found earlier ( Table 5 ) that longer-term interest rates show some reaction to the Chairman's testimony but none to FOMC statements. 23 We also found one date, March 8, 1995, on which the Chairman commented on the value of the dollar. However, this is the only occurrence of such a statement over our sample, and we do not include it in the analysis.
above. One problem is that the occurrence of comments on valuations is less frequent than statements about the economy or future policy. In addition, we are particularly concerned with the sign of the asset price response to these statements. Thus, we simply look at the behavior of those asset prices on the dates of the Chairman's comments and compare it in each case to the average volatility that occurred over the preceding month.
The results, shown in Table 7 , indicate that these asset prices did not respond in a consistent way to the Chairman's comments. Of the ten comments on equity valuation, equity prices moved notably lower on only two occasions-in July 1998 and October 1999. In each of these instances, market participants clearly took note of the Chairman's comments on valuation, but the decline in equity prices probably cannot be entirely attributed to those comments. Indeed, in the first instance market participants were also disappointed that the Chairman did not hint at an imminent cut in the federal funds rate, while the second instance coincided with a surprisingly sharp jump in the producer price index. Moreover, the movements in equity prices on all the other days listed are within the range of two standard deviations of the changes observed over the month preceding each date (or are outside the range with the opposite sign). For example, the well-known "irrational exuberance" speech in December 1996 pushed down equity prices, but not by an unusually large amount. Overall, we conclude that market participants have not reacted strongly to the Chairman's comments about asset valuations. One possible explanation is that the statements have not been all that forceful and have in some cases been very indirect.
However, we feel that the more likely explanation is that market participants simply choose not to strongly update their beliefs about the appropriate valuation of assets based on the Chairman's comments.
Implications for Central Bankers
Previous research has demonstrated that monetary policy actions affect the shape of the yield curve, and simple observation of financial market behavior indicates that central bank talk is also important in that regard. This paper has provided evidence on the extent to which central bank talk matters and on the channels through which it operates. In this section, we summarize our results and offer some thoughts on related issues. In doing so, we draw not only on the findings but also on our experience in the policymaking process at the Federal Reserve.
Our most important finding is that the forms of central bank communication Second, talk is also a way the Federal Reserve signals a revision to its assessment of the economic outlook. That revision affects rates further out the yield curve because the central bank is likely to act on its new outlook-and if it tends to react to such revisions gradually, the change in intermediate-term rates will tend to be greater than the change in short-term rates. We've labeled this second avenue the "economic-outlook" component.
We argue that these components may be present in the effects of policy actions as well.
That is, unexpected decisions by the FOMC may cause investors to reassess their views on the economy in addition to their perceptions of the near-term policy inclinations of the central bank.
Our decomposition suggests that the effects of FOMC statements arise to a large extent by conveying information about the economic outlook, while the effects of policy The Federal Reserve has been broadly correct on the direction of the economy and prices over the past two decades, on occasion spotting trends and developments before they were evident to market participants, and this record has enhanced its reputation and credibility. Indeed, Romer and Romer (2000) provide statistical evidence that the Federal Reserve staff forecasts for output and inflation have been more accurate than private sector forecasts over the past several decades. As discussed in that paper, the impressive forecasting performance of the Federal Reserve may reflect the fact that it devotes considerable resources to analyzing and predicting the course of the U.S.
economy-much more than any other entity. As a result, at least a part of the identified effects of the economic-outlook component likely reflects revisions to private forecasts of the economy.
Another reason to infer some updating of private forecasts is the magnitude of the change in the forward rate one to two years ahead. This rate presumably would not move as much if market participants thought the central bank was wrong in its assessment, because they would expect the Federal Reserve to at least partly learn about its error within a year or two. Instead, this component involves exactly the same term structure movement as found in response to macroeconomic data releases (which obviously contain actual economic news rather than perceived FOMC mistakes). Based on these arguments, it seems likely that investors at least partly update their own views on the economic outlook when the FOMC's outlook changes.
Of course, the effects of central bank statements are more complicated than assumed in this simple decomposition. We believe that the two factors identified are important components, but we also recognize that statements convey other relevant information at times. One possibility in countries without explicit inflation targets is that statements may provide information about the long-run inflation target of the central bank, information that could have an impact on interest rates with longer maturities. The observation that statements have significant effects on market interest rates raises the question of whether releasing statements provides the central bank with an additional policy instrument. In some sense it does, but if so, it is an instrument whose use is very constrained. The central bank may have some discretion over whether to put out a statement or not, but it does not have complete discretion over its content-the statement is constrained to provide an honest assessment of the central bank's outlook for the economy.
In some circumstances, the temptation for the central bank to shade its assessments can arise from the very credibility of central bank forecasts. For example, a central bank that wants to indicate an imminent easing through a statement may be concerned that the statement will signal to investors that the economy is weak, thereby damping or even reversing any stimulative effect, say by depressing spending or reducing equity prices. We do not deny that such situations arise, but neither do we believe that they present overwhelming difficulties. After all, the statement provides only one piece of a broad array of information that investors and private agents use in formulating their views and in making economic decisions. To the extent it does have an effect, the statement should tend to move investors' forecasts closer to the appropriate level.
Because this adjustment would have taken place eventually, the effect of the statement is simply one of timing.
Moreover, central bank statements can be very helpful in particular circumstances. They can be used to prevent investors from misinterpreting and overreacting to policy actions, and they can provide corrective information when the central bank believes that investors are unduly pessimistic or optimistic about the economic outlook. In regard to the first circumstance, statements can help market participants differentiate policy actions that respond to a major change in the economic outlook from those that are taken to provide insurance against a particular outcome in the context of a basically satisfactory outlook. Shaping accurate expectations about the economy and policy inclinations might be especially important when the nominal policy rate is very low and the central bank remains concerned about inadequate demand. In those circumstances, policy cannot as readily adjust through conventional actions to compensate for market perceptions that don't appropriately reflect the expectations and the intended strategy of the central bank.
Our results also suggest some interesting conclusions about the types of central bank statements that influence markets. One finding is that FOMC statements that contained a balance-of-risks assessment did not generate a larger market response than did statements without one. This result is somewhat surprising, given that market commentary seems to focus so much on the risk assessment. Although the risk assessment attracts a great deal of attention when it is included, it does not appear to be a necessary ingredient for conveying relevant information to market participants. That is, market participants do pay attention to the more extensive language that describes the economic outlook. This conclusion is supported by the sizable effect of Chairman Greenspan's congressional testimonies, which do not convey an explicit balance-of-risks assessment. Indeed, the effects of those testimonies are found to be larger and more significant (particularly at longer maturities) than the effects of FOMC statements, indicating that market participants find useful information in the more detailed discussions of the state of the economy and the outlook.
We would argue that providing more detailed language has considerable advantages over a simple, discrete categorization of the risks. A detailed statement, speech, or testimony can provide a more accurate description of the outlook for the economy, one that can better describe the various risks, describe how potential outcomes may be conditional on particular events, and provide the appropriate amount of nuance and caution regarding the central bank's views. Some of that information unavoidably gets lost when the central bank tries to describe those views with a simple summary, like a balance of risks assessment, a point forecast, or a brief statement. The summary can be given excessive weight by market participants who, in some circumstances, will not recognize the conditionality of the central bank's outlook and its unwillingness to commit itself to a particular course of action in an uncertain world. 27 We recognize, however, that it may be difficult to get a committee with diverse views to agree on a detailed statement. In that regard, a short statement that categorizes the outlook, such as the balance-of-risks assessment, may provide a useful communication device.
We find tentative evidence that one kind of central bank talk didn't matter at alldiscussions of asset price valuations. Indeed, a small set of Chairman Greenspan's speeches and testimonies that questioned the valuation of particular assets generally had no identifiable effect on the prices of those assets, suggesting that investors typically do Consequently, it is not surprising that investors appear to have ignored warnings from the Federal Reserve about the level of equity prices.
Avenues for Future Research
Overall, investors seem to be quite attentive to central bank statements. Our results provide some tentative evidence on the nature of the effects of central bank talk.
From a practitioner's standpoint, this is an important topic that warrants extensive research-the better we understand these effects, the better central banks will be able to structure their public pronouncements to achieve the benefits of transparency.
We believe that inflation-targeting countries provide fertile ground for estimating the differential effects of various kinds of talk. Inflation targeting is typically accompanied by an emphasis on the release of timely information about the views of the central bank, and that information often varies fairly widely in terms of detail and content. The Bank of England, for example, releases several relevant statements, including a statement from the Monetary Policy Committee, the minutes from its meetings within the intermeeting period, and an inflation report. An investigation of the extent to which these different statements affect financial markets, and whether they seem to convey different types of information, would be of particular interest.
In addition, we have not addressed a topic that is obviously critical to the potential benefits of central bank statements: whether central banks typically achieve the desired in relatively simple statements about the future.
effect of their statements. Historical experience suggests that it is sometimes difficult to determine how market participants will interpret a given statement or whether they will put greater emphasis on particular passages than the central bank intended.
Another consideration is that there may be important interactions between central bank statements and policy actions. The analysis above focused on statement effects that were, by assumption, independent of policy actions. It could be the case, for example, that it is easier to reinforce the effects of a policy action with a statement in the same direction than it is to convey a message in the opposite direction. Such interactions are an interesting topic for further research.
Conclusions
Central banks will and should be judged on results-whether they achieve price stability and effectively stabilize economic activity around its potential. *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level. Non-FOMC days are all of those in the sample on which there was no FOMC meeting or policy action, no statement by the FOMC, and no testimony or speech by Chairman Greenspan. Increases in the variance of the error term are measured relative to that observed over the week preceding the FOMC decision. All interest rate changes are measured in basis points; changes in stock prices and the dollar are measured in percentage points. 4.0 4.9 ** indicates that the decline in equity prices or the widening of credit spreads was greater in absolute value than two standard deviations of the movements observed in the preceding month. Speeches that were given after markets closed are dated as the following business day.
